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Recent globalization has been characterized by a decline in the costs of cross-border trade in farm
and other products. It has been driven primarily by the information and communication technology
revolution and—in the case of farm products—by reductions in governmental distortions to agricul-
tural production, consumption and trade. Both have boosted economic growth and reduced poverty
globally, especially in Asia. The ﬁrst but maybe not the second of these drivers will continue in
coming decades. World food prices will depend also on whether (and if so by how much) farm pro-
ductivity growth continues to outpace demand growth and to what extent diets in emerging
economies move towards livestock and horticultural products at the expense of staples. Demand
in turn will be driven not only by population and income growth, but also by crude oil prices if
they remain at current historically high levels, since that will affect biofuel demand. Climate
change mitigation policies and adaptation, water market developments and market access standards
particularly for transgenic foods will add to future production, price and trade uncertainties.
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1. THE ISSUE
One of the most striking features of economic develop-
ment is the relative decline in the agricultural sector in
growing economies. Also typical for countries with
above-average population density is a decline in their
agricultural comparative advantage as capital accumu-
lation and industrialization proceed. An export-led
boom in another sector, or large prolonged inﬂows of
foreign aid, also weaken the international competi-
tiveness of a country’s farm sector. Changes in
consumption patterns (the slow growth in consump-
tion of farm products and, in middle-income
countries, the move away from grains and other staples
and towards livestock and horticultural products) also
alter the net trade situation of countries. However,
whether that leads to a decline or a rise in the overall
food self-sufﬁciency in and net exports of total agricul-
tural products depends also on productivity growth in
farming relative to non-agricultural production
(Anderson 1987), and in trends in government assist-
ance to farmers relative to producers of other
tradables. In the past, price-distorting policies have
gradually changed from disfavouring to favouring agri-
culture relative to other tradable sectors as per capita
incomes grow (Anderson 2009); globally, productivity
growth has been faster in the farm sector than in other
sectors (Martin & Mitra 2001).
A further inﬂuence on agricultural trade has been the
acceleration of globalization over the past quarter-
century. That has been characterized by a rapid decline
in the costs of cross-border trade in farm and other
products, driven by declines in the costs of trans-
porting bulky and perishable products long distances,
the information and communication technology (ICT)
revolution and major reductions in governmental distor-
tions to agricultural trade. Together, these developments
have boosted economic growth and reduced extreme pov-
erty globally, and in the process altered global agricultural
production, consumption and hence trade patterns.
This paper ﬁrst examines the key drivers of the
above developments over the past four or ﬁve decades
and then draws on that analysis and recent events to
suggest likely drivers of—and uncertainties associated
with—global food and other agricultural trade trends
over the next four decades.
2. KEY DRIVERS OF CHANGE SINCE 1960
The ﬁrst part of this section summarizes the structural
changes in global agricultural markets and trade since
the 1960s. The second part outlines one set of drivers,
namely rapid technological changes including those
that have lowered trade costs for farm products over
the past quarter-century. The third part summarizes
reforms to agricultural and trade policies since the
1980s and economy-wide modelling results that
suggest those reforms have more than halved the
global trade- and welfare-reducing effects of price-
distorting policies.
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One of the most striking features of economic develop-
ment is the relative decline of the agricultural sector in
growing economies. Also typical for countries with a
reasonably high population density is a decline in
their agricultural comparative advantage as industrializ-
ation proceeds (or when another sector such as mining,
manufacturing or services enjoys an export-led boom or
there is a sustained inﬂow of foreign aid). There is a
wide dispersion across regions of the world in the
importance of agriculture in national GDP and employ-
ment, in endowments of arable land and fresh water as
well as capital per worker, in the availability of modern
farm and non-farm technologies that take account of
relative factor prices and hence in agricultural compara-
tive advantage. Appropriate indicators of agricultural
comparative advantage are difﬁcult to assemble,
because government policies that distort food markets
are so pervasive and because of the range of technol-
ogies made available via adaptive research and
development (R&D) investments to suit different rela-
tive factor scarcities (Hayami & Ruttan 1985; Alston
et al. 2009a,b). Thus, the sector’s share of national
exports relative to the global average, or even net
exports as a ratio of exports plus imports of primary
agricultural products (both shown in table 1 for the
key regions of the world), are rather poor reﬂections
of comparative advantage, and they also conceal much
intra-regional diversity.
A key determinant of agricultural comparative
advantage differences across countries is relative
factor endowments, which can change substantially
as economies grow at varying rates. Differing technol-
ogies also can have an inﬂuence on the supply side of
the market, and those differences can persist for long
periods if governments under-invest in agricultural
R&D. As for differences in tastes on the demand
side, international diffusion tends to ensure they are
far less important than factor endowment differences
over the very long term. Nonetheless, changes in the
preferred mix of foods away from starchy staples and
towards livestock and horticultural products as consu-
mers move from low-income to high-income status can
inﬂuence comparative advantages within the farm
sector.
The simplest model to capture the inﬂuence of
changes in relative factor endowments in a growing
world economy is perhaps that provided by Leamer
(1987). His model has just three productive factors:
natural resources, labour time and produced capital
(human as well as physical, where the human com-
ponent is deﬁned here to include not only skills but
also technologies available in each country). The
higher a country’s endowment of natural resources rela-
tive to the other two factors, when compared with the
global average, the stronger its comparative advantage
in primary products. The latter can be interpreted as
food and agricultural products if the only natural
resources are agricultural land and water; but, if a
country also has resources that can be depleted through
mining (e.g. minerals, energy raw materials or natural
forests), then changes in the proﬁtability of such
mining also will affect agricultural comparative advan-
tages. Generally, a mining boom, or a sustained inﬂow
of foreign aid, would diminish a country’s agricultural
comparative advantage (Corden 1984). However, if
the boom was driven by a surge in the international
price of non-farm tradables (rather than supply driven
as with the discovery of a new reserve of minerals or a
new mining technology), and the product whose price
rose has an agricultural substitute, then producers of
that farm product could also beneﬁt—as discussed in
§3a with respect to biofuels.
Table 1. Resource endowments and agriculture’s share of regional economy, 2000–2006. From World Bank (2008) and (for
employment) Sandri et al. (2007). n.a., not applicable.
arable land
per capita
(ha), 2005
fresh water
per capita
(’000 m
3),
2005
GDP
per
capita
(US$),
2005
agriculture’s
share (%) of
GDP, 2006
agriculture’s
share (%) of
employment
agriculture’s
share (%) of
exports, 2006
net agric
exports/
(agric
X þ M),
2000–2004
1960–
1964
2000–
2004
world 0.22 6.8 6.6 3 59 44 8 0
HICs 0.36 9.6 31.1 2 17 3 8 0.04
developing
countries
0.20 6.3 1.6 10 70 35 11 n.a.
East Asia 0.11 5.0 1.4 12 80 60 8 20.14
South Asia 0.14 1.2 0.6 18 75 57 13 0.07
Eastern Europe
and the CIS
0.57 11.5 3.2 7 n.a. 19 7 20.06
Middle East
and North
Africa
0.18 0.8 3.5 12 n.a. n.a. 5 n.a.
sub-Saharan
Africa
0.25 5.1 0.8 15 .80 56 n.a. 0.20
Latin America
and the
Caribbean
0.27 24.5 4.1 6 48 19 17 0.51
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booms, sustainable economic growth is generally due
to growth in produced capital (including available
technologies) per worker. Some of any increment in
produced capital may be used to expand primary pro-
duction, but mostly it is used in other sectors. This
tendency begins at an earlier stage of development,
and thus, at a lower national wage rate, the smaller a
country’s per-worker endowment of land and other
exploitable natural resources, and the smaller its
investment in new technologies for agriculture relative
to non-farm sectors. Thus, the ranking of countries
according to their agricultural comparative advantage
is correlated with their farmland/labour endowment
ratio, while their capital intensity of agricultural pro-
duction is correlated with their produced capital/
labour endowment ratio. A crude index of the latter
is simply per capita GDP, reported for 2005 in
table 1 along with arable land and fresh water per
capita.
Global agricultural trade has grown much slower
than trade in other products. Prior to the 1960s,
farm products accounted for more than 30 per cent
of all merchandise trade globally, but since the begin-
ning of this century their share has averaged less than 9
per cent (Sandri et al. 2007).
Since agriculture’s share of global GDP has also
fallen, a more appropriate indicator of the changing
extent to which agriculture is globalized is the share
of agricultural and food production or consumption
that is traded internationally. Table 2 provides esti-
mates of that for various regions, based on a sample
of 75 countries that account for all but 1/10 of the
world’s population and agricultural GDP. Those num-
bers suggest that agriculture’s tradability has increased
considerably since the 1960s, rising from about
one-ninth to about one-sixth of global production or
consumption. However, a glance at the regional data
reveals that most of that change is due to increased
intra-European trade behind the EU’s common exter-
nal trade barrier, apart from some growth (from low
bases) since the 1970s in agricultural imports by
Asia and Latin America.
Particularly striking is the decline in the extent to
which African agricultural production is exported,
bringing down the region’s agricultural self-sufﬁciency
Table 2. Export orientation, import dependence and self-sufﬁciency in global agricultural production, by region,
a 1961–
2004 (per cent at undistorted prices). From Anderson (2009, ch. 1), compiled from Anderson & Valenzuela (2008) using
estimates of total agricultural production valued at undistorted prices and the FAO’s total agricultural trade value data for 65
countries that together account for about 90% of the world’s population and agricultural GDP.
1961–1964 1970–1974 1980–1984 1990–1994 2000–2004
exports as share of production
Africa 19 17 12 7 8
Asia 5 4 4 6 5
Latin America 24 27 16 16 27
Western Europe 13 16 27 37 43
USA and Canada 14 14 20 20 21
Australia and New Zealand 41 35 44 43 48
Japan 1 2 1 0 1
all countries 11 11 13 16 16
developing countries 8 8 7 8 8
HICs 14 15 22 26 29
imports as share of apparent consumption
Africa 2 2 5 4 4
Asia 4 4 8 16 14
Latin America 2 4 7 10 17
Western Europe 32 28 34 41 46
USA and Canada 4 4 5 9 12
Australia and New Zealand 3 2 3 5 6
Japan 23 24 24 26 27
all countries 11 10 12 19 18
developing countries 3 4 8 14 13
HICs 18 16 20 25 27
self-sufﬁciency ratio
Africa 120 117 107 104 105
Asia 102 100 96 89 91
Latin America 129 132 110 107 114
Western Europe 78 85 90 94 94
USA and Canada 111 112 119 114 111
Australia and New Zealand 165 151 174 170 183
Japan 78 78 77 74 74
all countries 100 101 101 96 98
developing countries 105 104 99 93 95
HICs 96 98 103 101 102
aIncludes intra-EU trade.
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ades to 2000–2004 (table 2). It needs to be kept in
mind, though, that this could be in part owing to the
region’s changing comparative advantages rather than
to trade taxes. Such a change in comparative advan-
tage could be because of a boom in other sectors of
African economies, for example due to the local dis-
covery, exploitation and exportation of mining
products, or because of the large sums of foreign aid
ﬂowing into the region, either of which would
strengthen a country’s currency and thus make its
farmers less competitive in international markets.
Another possible explanation is the faster growth of
farm relative to non-farm productivity in the rest of
the world, which is consistent with the relatively slow
growth in Africa’s crop yields. Alston et al. (2009a)
found that land productivity growth between 1961
and 2005 increased only 2.19 per cent per year in
Africa compared with 2.72 per cent in all developing
countries, and they note that the lag in farm labour
productivity growth was even greater (0.76% for
Africa versus 1.93% per year for all developing
countries). A third possibility is that other regions
have reduced their trade costs, or their anti-agricul-
tural and anti-trade policy biases, more than have
countries of sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades.
The latter is supported by recently compiled evidence
on policy trends reported in Anderson (2009).
(b) Technological changes and trade costs
In addition to governmental barriers to trade, there are
natural trade barriers caused by transport, information
and communication costs. Farm products are rela-
tively bulky commodities, making them costly to
transport over long distances, especially if they are per-
ishable. Some of them are desired in fresh form, a
desire that can be satisﬁed only in season. Hence,
food prices can vary substantially across time and
space for these reasons.
If we deﬁne globalization as a decline in costs of
doing business across space, there has been, and con-
tinues to be, great scope for farmers and food
consumers to be beneﬁciaries of its acceleration.
When the relevant space includes national borders, a
key effect of such cost declines is to enhance the inter-
national integration of markets. A standard indicator
of such integration is the trade-to-GDP ratio. Mer-
chandise trade for centuries has grown faster than
output for all periods (other than between the two
world wars), and the gap has been larger in the
1990s than in any earlier period since reliable data
became available. According to Maddison (2001,
p. 363) merchandise exports as a share of global
GDP was only 1 per cent in 1820, 5 per cent in
1870 and 8 per cent in 1913 at 1990 prices. Between
1975–1979 and 2000–2004, however, the share of
all goods and services exports as a share of global
GDP rose from 19 per cent to 26 per cent (Sandri
et al. 2007).
The impacts of the drivers of globalization are not
uniform across countries, which is showing up in
trade specialization data: between 1980–1984 and
2000–2004, the share of non-food manufactures in
merchandise exports rose from just over one-quarter
to almost two-thirds for middle-income countries
(and from less than half to 90% for China), and the
share of processed food products in the value of food
and agricultural exports over that period rose from
54 per cent to 69 per cent for high-income countries
(HICs) and from 49 per cent to 67 per cent for Asia
(Sandri et al. 2007).
The lowered cost of moving products and people
was dominated, in the middle half of the twentieth
century, by the falling cost of motor vehicle and aero-
plane transportation, thanks to mass production of
such goods and associated services. Ocean freight
rates (helped by containerization) and telephone
charges also fell massively over this period. Transport
costs can be crudely captured by the extent to which
a product’s Cost Insurance and Freight (c.i.f.)
import price at its destination port exceeds its Free
On Board (f.o.b.) export price at its port of origin.
For US merchandise, that markup fell from 10 per
cent in the 1950s to 6 per cent in the 1990s (Frankel
2000). An example for agriculture was the change
from handling crop products such as grains in bags
to bulk for storage and for land and water transpor-
tation, reducing substantially transport and storage
costs including post-harvest losses. The bag-to-bulk
transformation began in industrial countries following
World War II and gradually permeated middle-income
countries such as Argentina and Brazil, and it is now
becoming more widespread in low-income countries
too. Other improvements, which need not show up
as a reduction in the f.o.b./c.i.f. price gap, are
improved transport services such as faster and more
frequent schedules and controlled atmosphere con-
tainers that allow perishables such as meats, milk
products and fresh fruit and vegetables to be
transported longer distances by sea or air.
A more recent phenomenon, beginning near the
end of the twentieth century, is digital—namely the
ICT revolution. Aided by deregulation and privatiza-
tion of telecom markets in many countries, it has
been lowering long-distance communication costs
enormously, especially the cost of rapidly accessing
and processing knowledge, information and ideas
from anywhere in the world. Science has been
among the beneﬁciaries of the digital revolution,
spawning yet other revolutions, such as in biotechnol-
ogy and nanotechnology.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) liberalization
sometimes has been a complement to trade liberaliza-
tion. Developing countries so far are only minor
players as hosts of FDI in processed food, beverages
and tobacco, however: in 2007, their inﬂow was less
than $3 billion, compared with an inﬂow of $46 billion
into HICs. Flows of FDI into the primary agricultural
sector were even less, such that FDI accounted for less
than 0.3 per cent of capital formation in developing
country agriculture compared with 13 per cent for
the overall economy of that country group
(UNCTAD 2009, ch. 3). Nonetheless, Reardon &
Timmer (2007) argued that FDI has facilitated the
transformation of food value chains over the past two
decades, in particular via the expansion and merger/
takeover activity in supermarket retailing. In most
3010 K. Anderson Review. Globalization of world agriculture
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majority of sales, and in many of those countries, the
four top ﬁrms have more than two-thirds of sales.
Supermarkets have been spreading even faster in
developing countries than they did in HICs. This is
having dramatic effects further up the value chain.
First-stage processors, food and beverage manufac-
turers, and distributors are also becoming more
concentrated so as to better match the bargaining
power of supermarkets, although typically in narrowly
focused industries rather than across the board as in
supermarket retailing. Their actions are constrained
too by the supermarkets’ capacity to develop their
own brands and even their own processing and distri-
bution. In turn, these developments are altering
dramatically the way farmers are expected to supply
those markets, with the emphasis on timely delivery
of uniformly high-quality products with very speciﬁc
attributes (Reardon & Timmer 2007; Swinnen 2007;
Reardon et al. 2009). According to Swinnen &
Vandeplas (2009), though, consumers and possibly
even farmers in developing countries are beneﬁtting
from the trade and investment liberalization and ICT
revolution that have stimulated these changes, because
of the ﬁerce competition that ensues among
middlemen along the food value chain.
(c) Agricultural trade distortions and policy
reforms
In addition to agricultural trade being affected by
economic growth and declining trade costs, it has
been greatly affected by distortionary government pol-
icies. Since the 1950s, world agriculture has been
characterized by the persistence of high agricultural
protection in developed countries, by anti-agricultural
and anti-trade policies of developing countries and by
the tendency for both sets of countries to use trade
measures to stabilize their domestic food market—
thereby exacerbating price ﬂuctuations in the
international marketplace. This disarray has not only
been highly inefﬁcient but has also contributed to
global inequality and poverty (since the vast majority
of the world’s poorest households depend directly or
indirectly on farming for their livelihoods; see Anderson
et al. 2010a). The situation worsened up to the mid-
1980s, with agricultural protection in Europe, North
America and Japan peaking and international food
prices plummeting in 1986, thanks in large measure
to an agricultural export subsidy war between the US
and the European community. Meanwhile, many devel-
oping countries had been reducing farm incomes not
only by heavily taxing agricultural exports but also,
albeit indirectly, by protecting manufacturers from
import competition and overvaluing the national
currency.
This disarray in world agriculture meant that there
was over-production of farm products in HICs and
under-production in more-needy developing
countries. It also meant there was less international
trade in farm products than would be the case under
free trade, thereby ‘thinning’ the market for these
weather-dependent products and thus making them
more volatile. The extent of that volatility is evident
in ﬁgure 1. Using a stochastic model of world food
markets, one study estimates that the coefﬁcient of
variation of international food prices in the 1980s
was three times greater than it would have been
under free trade and that the volume of international
trade in grains, livestock products and sugar was half
what it could have been (Tyers & Anderson 1992,
tables 6.9 and 6.14).
During the past quarter-century, numerous devel-
oping countries and HICs have begun to reform
their agricultural price and trade policies. This has
contributed to the rise in the extent to which farm
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Figure 1. Real international food price index, 1900–2008 (1977–1979 ¼ 100). The deﬂator used is the price of manufactured
exports to developing countries from the ﬁve largest HICs (France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA). Author’s
compilation using data from Pfaffenzeller et al. (2007), updated from 2004 with data from www.worldbank.org/prospects.
Solid line, real food price index.
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Much of this reform was undertaken unilaterally or
as part of regional trading arrangements, but some
was also undertaken in response to international
pressures such as Uruguay Round stipulations,
commitments required for accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and structural adjustment
loan conditionality by international ﬁnancial insti-
tutions. Meanwhile, reforms in some middle-income
economies (most noticeably Korea) have ‘overshot’,
going from discouraging their farmers to protecting
them from import competition—which raises concerns
that other emerging economies may follow suit and
pursue the same agricultural protection growth path
of more-advanced economies in earlier stages of their
economic development.
A recent World Bank research project (see Anderson
(2009) and www.worldbank.org/agdistortions) devel-
oped a series of indicators to measure the impact of
those interventions and subsequent policy developments
on farmers’ incentives. Its most basic measure, the nom-
inal rate of assistance (NRA) is the percentage by which
government policies have raised gross returns to farmers
above what they would be without the government’s
intervention (or lowered them, if the NRA is negative).
Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own out-
puts but also (albeit indirectly through changes to factor
market prices and the exchange rate) by the incentives
offered to non-agricultural producers. That is, it is rela-
tive prices and hence relative rates of government
assistance that affect producers’ incentives, so a relative
rate of assistance (RRA) was also calculated.
The NRAs from the World Bank study, which
involves 75 countries (including 20 HICs) which
together account for 92 per cent of global agricultural
GDP, are sumarized in ﬁgure 2. They reveal that
assistance to farmers in HICs rose steadily from the
mid-1950s until the end of the 1980s, apart from a
small dip when international food prices (see
ﬁgure 1) spiked around 1973–1974. After peaking at
more than 50 per cent in the mid-1980s, the average
NRA for HICs has fallen a little, depending on the
extent to which one believes that some new farm pro-
grammes are ‘decoupled’ in the sense of no longer
inﬂuencing production decisions. For developing
countries, the average NRA for agriculture has been
rising, but from a level of around 225 per cent
during the period from the mid-1950s to the early
1980s to nearly 10 per cent in the ﬁrst half of the
present decade.
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Figure 2. Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in HICs and European transition economies and in developing countries,
1955–2004 (per cent, weighted averages). The European transition economies is denoted by the World Bank as ECA, its acro-
nym for (Central and Eastern) Europe and Central Asia. From Anderson (2009, ch. 1), based on estimates in Anderson &
Valenzuela (2008). Black line, HIC and ECA; dashed line, HIC and ECA, including decoupled payments; grey line, developing
countries.
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the fact that the exporting and import-competing sub-
sectors of agriculture have very different NRAs.
Figure 3 reveals that while the average NRA for expor-
ters has been negative throughout (going from 220%
to 230% before coming back up to almost zero in
2000–2004), the NRA for import-competing farmers
in developing countries has ﬂuctuated between 20 per
cent and 30 per cent (and even reached 40% in the
years of low prices in the mid-1980s). The anti-trade
bias within agriculture (the taxing of both exports and
imports) has diminished for developing countries
since the mid-1980s, but the NRA gap between the
import-competing and export subsectors still averages
around 20 percentage points (and it has grown to 40
percentage points for HICs, although there even
exporters have enjoyed positive NRAs). Figure 3 also
reveals that the NRA for import-competing farmers in
developing countries has increased at virtually the
same pace as that in HICs, suggesting that growth in
agricultural protection from import competition is
something that tends to begin at modest levels of per
capita income rather than being a phenomenon
exclusive to HICs.
The improvement in farmers’ incentives in develop-
ing countries is understated by the above NRA
estimates, because those countries have also reduced
their assistance to producers of non-agricultural trad-
able goods, most notably via cuts in restrictions on
imports of manufactures. The decline in the weighted
average NRA for the latter, depicted in ﬁgure 4, was
clearly much greater than the increase in the average
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Figure 3. Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all covered agricultural products (covered products
only, and the total also includes non-tradables), HICs and developing countries, 1955–2007. (a) Developing countries. (b)
HICs plus Europe’s transition economies. From Anderson (2009, ch. 1), based on estimates in Anderson & Valenzuela
(2008). Black lines, import competing; grey lines, exportables; dashed lines, total.
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the mid-1980s, consistent with the ﬁnding of Krueger
et al. (1988, 1991) two decades ago. For the period
since the mid-1980s, changes in the NRAs of both sec-
tors have contributed almost equally to the
improvement in incentives to farmers. The RRA for
developing countries as a group went from 246 per
cent in the second half of the 1970s to 1 per cent in
the ﬁrst half of the present decade. This increase
(from a coefﬁcient of 0.54 to 1.01) is equivalent to
an almost doubling in the relative price of farm pro-
ducts, which is a huge change in the fortunes of
developing country farmers in just a generation. This
is mostly because of the changes in Asia, but even
for Latin America this relative price hike is one-half,
while for Africa this indicator improves by only one-
eighth. As for HICs, assistance to manufacturing was
on average much less than assistance to farmers,
even in the 1950s, and its decline since then has
had only a minor impact on that group’s average
RRA (ﬁgure 4). The exceptions are Australia and
New Zealand, where manufacturing protection had
been very high and its decline occurred several decades
later than in other HICs (Anderson et al. 2007).
The above inﬂuences of policies focus on long-term
trends, but policies also inﬂuence year-to-year ﬂuctu-
ations around trend prices and quantities as
governments seek to reduce ﬂuctuations in domestic
food markets. One way for a country to achieve that
objective is by varying the restrictions on its inter-
national trade in food according to seasonal
conditions domestically and changes in prices interna-
tionally. Anderson et al. (2010b) capture this
phenomenon by estimating the elasticities of trans-
mission of the international product price to the
domestic market, using a geometric lag formulation
for each product for all focus countries for the period
since 1985. The unweighted average estimate for the
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Figure 4. Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and relative rate of assistance, developing
countries and HICs, 1955–2004 (per cent, production-weighted averages across countries). (a) Developing countries.
Dashed line, RRA; black line, NRA non-agricultural tradables; grey line, NRA agricultural tradables. (b) HICs. Black line,
NRA agriculture; grey line, NRA non-agriculture; dashed line, RRA. The RRA is deﬁned as 100*[(100 þ NRAag
t)/(100 þ
NRAnonag
t) 2 1], where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the percentage NRAs for the tradable parts of the agricultural and
non-agricultural sectors, respectively. From Anderson (2009, ch. 1), based on the estimates in Anderson & Valenzuela (2008).
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suggesting that within the ﬁrst year little more than
half the movement in international prices of those
farm products is transmitted domestically.
To assess how far the world had come, and how far it
still has to go, in rectifying the disarray in world agricul-
ture, Valenzuela et al.( 2 0 0 9 )use the World Bank’s
global economy-wide model known as Linkage to pro-
vide a combined retrospective and prospective
analysis. It quantiﬁes the impacts both of past reforms
and current policies by comparing the effects of the
recent World Bank project’s distortion estimates for
the period 1980–1984 with those of 2004. The ﬁndings
from that economy-wide modelling study suggest that:
— Policy reforms from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s
improved global economic welfare by US$233 billion
per year, and removing all goods market distortions
that remained in 2004 would add another US$168
billion per year (in 2004 US dollars) implying, in
terms of global welfare, that the world had moved
three-ﬁfths of the way towards global free trade in
goods over that quarter-century.
— Developing economies beneﬁtted proportionately
more than high-income economies (1.0% com-
pared with 0.7% of national income) from those
past policy reforms and would gain nearly twice
as much as HICs if all countries were to complete
that reform process (an average increase of 0.9%
compared with 0.5% for HICs).
— Of those prospective welfare gains from global goods
trade liberalization, 70 per cent would come from
agriculture and food policy reform, which is a strik-
ing result given that the shares of agriculture and
food in global GDP and global trade are only 3 per
cent and 6 per cent, respectively.
— If the policies distorting goods trade in 2004
were removed, the share of global production of
farm products that is exported would rise from 8
per cent to 13 per cent (excluding intra-EU
trade), thereby reducing instability of prices and
reducing the quantities of those products traded.
— The developing countries’ share of the world’s pri-
mary agricultural exports rose from 43 per cent to
55 per cent, and its share of farm output from 58
per cent to 62 per cent, because of the reforms
since the early 1980s, and removing the remaining
goods market distortions would boost their export
and output shares even further, to 64 per cent
and 65 per cent, respectively.
— For developing countries as a group, net farm income
(value added in agriculture) is estimated to be 4.9 per
cent higher than it would have been without the
reforms of the past quarter-century, and if the farm
price and trade policies remaining in 2004 were
removed, then net farm incomes in developing
countries would rise a further 5.6 per cent, compared
withjust1.9percentfornon-agriculturalvalueadded.
3. FUTURE DRIVERS AND UNCERTAINTIES
TO 2050
With this as background, we are now able to consider
the likely drivers of changes in national agricultural
comparative advantages, trade costs and pertinent pol-
icies over the next four decades and their associated
uncertainties and impacts on global farm trade. The
list includes the following, each of which is considered
in turn in the rest of this section of the paper:
— growth in population, incomes and farm
productivity;
— crude oil price trends and ﬂuctuations and their
impact on biofuel demand;
— trade costs, the supermarket revolution and related
changes in food value chains;
— developments in policies distorting agricultural
incentives;
— climate changes and national and global policy
responses;
— reforms to water institutions and policies; and
— changes in agricultural R&D investments in
response to the above.
(a) Population, income and productivity
growth rates
The economic recession in the USA and Europe since
2007 has slowed global economic growth. How long
the recovery will take is uncertain because it depends
on how quickly risk perceptions abate, which depends
in turn on on-going government macroeconomic and
trade policy responses (McKibbin & Stoeckel 2009).
In that process of readjustment, while long-term
growth rates to 2050 may not be greatly affected, cur-
rencies may be realigned in ways that have long-term
effects on comparative advantages in farm products.
However, there is too much uncertainty surrounding
such possibilities at this stage to do more than simply
note them.
One recent set of population and per capita income
growth projections to 2050 is summarized in table 3.
Clearly, these projections imply signiﬁcant changes to
the economic centres of gravity of consumption in
the global economy, given differing income elasticities
of demand for various products. They also affect the
supply side of each economy: population growth
along with demographic changes and labour–leisure
choices inﬂuence the growth of the workforce, and
per capita income growth suggests an expansion in
the endowment of capital, whether it be in the form
of physical assets, workforce skills or new technologies.
In economy-wide computable general equilibrium
model projections, it is common to represent physical
capital assets and human skills explicitly, but to incor-
porate new technologies simply as shocks to total
factor productivity (TFP; the number of units of
each input needed to produce a unit of output). The
latter can be determined endogenously if the modeller
accepts projections of growth in per capita income and
in the various factors of production, but it is then a
challenge to allocate that aggregate TFP shock to
different sectors and to different industries within
those sectors. Typically, the agricultural sector’s TFP
growth rate is assumed to exceed that for the rest of
the economy, based on historical experience (see
Martin & Mitra 2001), so as to ensure the relative
price of farm products declines over time as in the
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With the growth in international food prices over the
2003–2008 period, however, expectations about
their future trend are now less certain. Is that rise
just due to a rundown of grain stocks globally, or is
it also because of the greater neglect of public invest-
ment on agricultural R&D in recent decades (Alston
et al. 2009b; Royal Society 2009)? The possibilities
of technological catch-up by lagging regions through
faster international technology transfer also need to
be considered (e.g. via the Green Revolution for
Africa initiative of the Gates and Rockefeller Foun-
dations, but also bearing in mind the apparent recent
surge in inﬂow of FDI in farming from countries rela-
tively poorly endowed with farm land and water; see
von Braun & Meinzen-Dick 2009). This suggests
that more than one set of assumptions about pro-
ductivity growth is needed in developing a family of
baselines for projections of agricultural productivity
to 2050.
Also of more relevance to projections now than in
the past are assumptions about food consumption
growth. Previously, modellers have relied on past
econometric evidence, suggesting that price and
income elasticities of demand for food decline with
per capita income, and earlier for lower-valued foods
such as staple grains and tubers than for livestock
and horticultural products. The latter switch will be
especially important with the rapid income growth in
populous emerging economies such as Brazil, China
and India. However, consumer concerns for food qual-
ity, food safety and the environment also need to be
considered, especially for HICs. Environmental con-
cerns affect things such as the disposal of packaging
or the carbon footprint associated with the transport
of goods and hence a desire to ‘buy local’ or at least
to know of the country of origin. Increasing numbers
of consumers wish to know how products are pro-
duced on-farm and processed, so as to assess
whether they are causing environmental damage or
reducing animal welfare. The continuing preference
of some consumers to avoid foods containing geneti-
cally modiﬁed organisms (GMOs) is a clear case in
point (Qaim 2009). This consumer concern has
already led to signiﬁcant government barriers to
trade based on production processes and to constraints
on domestic production. If that behaviour persists,
models of international trade need to differentiate
between products that may or do not contain
GMOs. Now that traceability information along with
other attributes can be stored on barcodes, these and
related biosecurity concerns can be reﬂected in the
demands that the large supermarket chains place on
their suppliers for information on myriad attributes
of products. This is adding to the need to incorporate
greater agricultural product differentiation across
suppliers in trade models.
It could be argued that the above concerns of con-
sumers are conﬁned to HICs, especially Western
Europe and Japan, where the quantity of food con-
sumed is unlikely to grow rapidly over the next four
decades because of relatively low population and
income growth and low-income elasticities of
demand for farm products there. However, that
would be to miss the point that high-income consu-
mers are willing to pay substantial premia for foods
that are perceived to be safer, of higher quality and
produced with minimal damage to the environment
and animal welfare. They are thus potentially highly
proﬁtable markets to which all farmers seek access,
including those in developing countries—notwith-
standing the disadvantage due to their higher carbon
footprint insofar as more transportation is probably
required to get their produce to those northern mar-
kets than is the case for local import-competing
farmers.
(b) Crude oil price trends: effect on biofuel
demand
While the real price of crude oil spiked brieﬂy in
mid-2008 at nearly three times its previous record, it
provides no guidance as to the long-term trend price
of petroleum and other energy raw materials. Spikes
in the spot price can occur whenever there is a
sudden change in expectations (including about
OPEC cartel actions), given the low short-term price
elasticities of demand and supply for crude oil.
Table 3. Global population and GDP per capita by region, actual 2005 and projected 2050. From Medvedev & van der
Mensbrugghe (2008).
population (billion)
real GDP per capita
(2005 US$ ’000)
real GDP per capita
(% of global
average)
2005 2050
a 2005 2050 2005 2050
world 6.4 8.8 (9.1) 6.6 15.1 100 100
HICs 1.1 1.1 (1.2) 31.1 58.3 470 385
developing countries 5.3 7.7 (7.9) 1.6 9.1 25 60
East Asia 1.9 2.3 (2.2) 1.4 12.8 21 84
South Asia 1.5 2.3 (2.3) 0.6 4.7 9 31
Eastern Europe and CIS 0.4 0.4 (0.7) 3.2 23.6 49 156
Middle East and North Africa 0.3 0.6 (0.6) 3.5 6.5 53 43
sub-Saharan Africa 0.7 1.4 (1.7) 0.8 4.8 11 32
Latin America and Caribbean 0.6 0.8 (0.7) 4.1 13.8 62 90
aAlternative population projections from the FAO are shown in parentheses (from Fischer et al. 2009).
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by government taxes and developments in known
reserves and in demand, which tend to change relatively
slowly as economies grow. Technological innovations in
exploration and exploitation have caused reserves to
expand faster than demand, so the world is apparently
not running out of fossil fuels: according to Smith
(2009), the ratio of reserves to annual production of
crude oil has grown from a multiple of 29 years in
1980 to 45 years in 2008, and if unconventional pet-
roleum resources (heavy oil, oil sands and oil shale)
are included, that adds another 160 years of available
supplies at current consumption levels.
The capacity of petroleum prices to spike occasion-
ally is not unlike that for grains. As Wright (2009)
pointed out, wheat, rice and maize are highly substitu-
table in the global market for calories, and when
aggregate stocks decline to minimal feasible levels for
trading and processing, prices become highly sensitive
to small shocks. By the middle of the past decade,
grain stocks-to-use ratios had declined to their lowest
levels for 25 years due to high-income growth in emer-
ging economies and de-stocking in China (Wiggins &
Keats 2010). When there were then some crop failures
plus a surge in demand because of biofuel mandates
and subsidies, grain prices started rising. The crude
oil price spike in 2008 raised further the demand for
biofuels (as well as fuel and fertilizer input costs for
farmers), and a sequence of trade restrictions by key
grain exporters, beginning in the thin global rice
market in the autumn of 2007, led to panic buying.
The linkage between crude oil and food prices will
remain strong when petroleum prices exceed the
threshold that makes biofuel production privately prof-
itable on a signiﬁcant scale, as in 2005–2008 (FAO
2008; IMF 2008; DEFRA 2010; Pfuderer et al.
2010). A continuation of biofuel subsidies and man-
dates will make this co-movement in above-trend
prices more common, as will the development of new
biofuel crop production technologies that effectively
lower the threshold oil price above which ethanol or
biodiesel production is proﬁtable (Chakravorty et al.
2009; Rajagopal et al. 2009). The latter has consider-
able potential over the next four decades, especially if
private life science companies view investments in bio-
fuel crop R&D as more proﬁtable than R&D in
politically sensitive GM food crops.
Mandates to include an increasing proportion of
biofuels in road transport fuel are now in place in
most OECD countries and in Brazil. The current tar-
gets in the EU mandate go through to 2020, and those
of the US to 2022. These policy measures, if they con-
tinue and remain inﬂexible, will add a certain demand
for biofuel crops no matter what happens to fossil fuel
and food prices. This will not reduce the extent of any
downward food price spike, however, because biofuel
production will be privately proﬁtable and so the man-
dates will tend to be redundant when grain and oilseed
prices are very low relative to fossil fuels prices. On the
other hand, mandates will exacerbate the extent of any
upward food price spike, because fuel retailers will be
required to include in their road fuel mix at least the
mandated quantity of biofuel regardless of its
high cost.
(c) Trade costs, the supermarket revolution and
related changes in food value chains
The ICT revolution will continue to lower trade costs,
including for supermarkets as they search globally for
the lowest-cost suppliers of products with the attri-
butes desired by their customers. Such searching by
supermarkets will increase also in response to govern-
ments lowering the remaining barriers to FDI in
retailing and associated logistics services. This will
more or less offset the impact of any new carbon
taxes or their equivalent on transportation costs. The
consequences of a continuing supermarket revolution
will spread right along the food value chain. One is
that ﬁrst-stage processors, food and beverage manu-
facturers, and distributors will become more
concentrated so as to better match the bargaining
power of supermarkets. Even so, supermarkets will
exploit their capacity to develop their own brands
and even their own processing and distribution. In
turn, these developments will alter dramatically the
way farmers supply those markets, with the emphasis
on timely delivery of uniform-quality products leading
to more-efﬁcient (possibly larger) farmers displacing
less-efﬁcient ones and thereby raising agricultural pro-
ductivity growth. Insofar as large supermarkets in
HICs source also from farmers in other countries,
their private standards will be set with at least some
consideration to the costs they impose on foreign sup-
pliers, and so may be less trade restricting than they
would be without that feature of globalization.
(d) Policies distorting agricultural incentives
The reasons why some countries have reformed their
price-distorting agricultural and trade policies more
than others in recent decades provide hints as to what
to expect in coming decades. The reasons are varied.
Some countries reformed unilaterally, apparently
having become convinced that it is in their own national
interest to do so. China is the most dramatic and signiﬁ-
cant example of the past three decades among
developing countries, and Australia and New Zealand
among the HICs (Anderson 2009). Other developing
countries may have done so partly to secure bigger
and better loans from international ﬁnancial institutions
and then, having taken that ﬁrst step, they have contin-
ued the process, even if somewhat intermittently. India
is one example, but there are numerous other examples
in Africa and Latin America. And some countries have
reduced their agricultural subsidies and import barriers
at least partly in response to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade’s multilateral Uruguay Round Agree-
ment on Agriculture and to opportunities to form or
expand regional integration agreements. The EU is
the most important example of committing to
reductions in farm protection, helped by its desire for
otherwise costly preferential trade agreements including
its expansion eastwards.
The EU reforms suggest that growth in agricultural
protection can be slowed and even reversed if
accompanied by re-instrumentation away from price
supports to decoupled measures or more direct
forms of farm income support—but the wealthiest
Western European countries (Norway and
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pressure to undertake major reform. The stark
example of Australia shows that one-off buyouts can
bring faster and even complete reform. In the USA,
by contrast, most subsidy cuts in the 1990s proved
to be short lived and have since been reversed, with
one set of analysts seeing few signs of that changing
in the foreseeable future (Orden et al. 2010).
In the developing countries, where levels of agricul-
tural protection are generally below those in HICs,
there are fewer signs of a slowdown of the upward
trend in protection from agricultural import compe-
tition over the past half-century. Indeed, there are
numerous signs that the governments of developing
countries want to keep open their options to raise agri-
cultural NRAs in the future, particularly via import
restrictions. One indicator is the high tariff bindings
to which developing countries committed themselves
following the Uruguay Round (Anderson & Martin
2006, table 1.2). Another is the demand by many
developing countries to be allowed to maintain their
rates of agricultural protection from import compe-
tition for reasons of food security, livelihood security
and rural development. This view has succeeded in
bringing ‘special products’ and a ‘special safeguard
mechanism’ into the multilateral trading system’s agri-
cultural negotiations, even though such policies would
raise domestic food prices in developing countries and
thus may worsen poverty and food security of the
urban poor while exacerbating instability in
international markets for farm products.
If the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda collapses,
or if Doha leads to only a weak agricultural agreement
full of exceptions for politically sensitive products and
safeguards, the governments of HICs may ﬁnd it more
difﬁcult to ward off agricultural protection lobbies.
This would make it more likely that developing
countries choose an agricultural protection path. The
potential cost of this alternative counterfactual could
be several times the estimated beneﬁt of a successful
Doha agreement when the counterfactual is assumed
to be current policies (Boue ¨t & Laborde 2008).
Regional and other preferential trading arrangements
may be able to reduce farm protection growth some-
what, but the experiences with regional integration
arrangements to date is mixed.
(e) Climate change and policy responses
Effects of climate change on aggregate global agricul-
tural production and its location across countries and
regions without and with mitigation and adaptation
are great unknowns, not least because there are many
possible government policy responses unilaterally and
multilaterally. Moreover, the uncertainties about
what policy instruments will be adopted by whom
and when will be spread over decades rather than
just the next few years. Land use undoubtedly will
be affected non-trivially; carbon credits and emissions
trading will have unknown and possibly major effects
depending among other things on whether/how/when
agriculture and forestry are included in the schemes
of various countries, as will any border tax adjustments
or other sanctions imposed on imports from countries
deemed to be not sharing the burden of reducing
greenhouse gases; biofuel mandates and subsidies
and emerging biofuel crop technologies are likely to
increasingly affect food markets, and even more so if
carbon taxes or emission caps raise the user price of
fossil fuels; crop yield ﬂuctuations will be greater
because of weather volatility and especially more
extreme weather events, leading to further triggers
for trade policy interventions aimed at stabilizing
domestic food markets and so on.
The literature on these and myriad other ways in
which agricultural markets are expected to be affected
directly and indirectly by climate change and associ-
ated policy and technological responses are growing
exponentially. Numerous global economic modellers
have begun analysing the possible effects of some of
the above inﬂuences on the international location of
agricultural production and trade in particular. One
of the more widely cited is Cline (2007), who pre-
dicted that by the 2080s, even with carbon
fertilization, agricultural output will be 8 per cent
lower in developing countries, 8 per cent higher in
HICs and 3 per cent lower globally. However, mitiga-
tion policies could have an adverse effect on
industrialization in developing countries and lead to
their agricultural sector in aggregate beneﬁtting
indirectly, although different types of border tax
adjustments by HICs would affect the outcome
non-trivially (Mattoo et al. 2009a,b). It is clearly very
difﬁcult to discern what the main inﬂuences are
likely to be over the next four decades, let alone to
quantify the effects of even the most likely of them.
This underscores the need for sensitivity analysis
around any baseline scenario to 2050 that does not
include any of the inﬂuences listed in the previous
paragraph.
(f) Reforms to water institutions and policies
Water is essential for growing food and critical for food
security, but in many parts of the world it has been one
of the most-abundant factors of production used in
agriculture. Certainly, it is not evenly spread across
the world (see column 2 of table 1), and irrigation
water property rights and water markets are poorly
developed in most countries.
With population growth and the increasing need for
non-farm uses of water, the urgency for policy reform in
this area is growing, especially outside temperate, well-
watered areas such as Europe (Rosegrant et al. 2002).
The experiences with reforms to date, such as in the
USA and Australia, indicate there will be much trial
and error in policy design and implementation and it
will take many decades before water markets are as efﬁ-
cient as farm land markets. This suggests that irrigation
water costs could well rise in coming decades but to
varying extents across the globe and in ways that
could have non-trivial impacts on the optimal location
of certain water-intensive crops.
(g) Agricultural research and development
investments
Agricultural R&D investments have had a huge payoff
(Alston et al. 2000). Yet there has been a considerable
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ades, and this may already be contributing to a
slowing of agricultural productivity growth (Alston
et al. 2009a,b). If that slowdown in investment was
in response to the low prices of food in international
markets in the mid-1980s, then the rise in those
prices in recent years, together with the newly per-
ceived need for adaptive research in response to
climate change and increased water scarcity, may
boost farm productivity growth over the next four dec-
ades. Advances in biotechnology will help raise
potential yields in ﬁeld trials and thus attainable
yields in the best farms, but much can also be gained
by reducing the gap between those attainable yields
and average on-farm yields, particularly in developing
countries.
Part of the slowdown in traditionally measured
gains from agricultural research in recent decades
may be due to research being directed away from
things such as maintaining and improving yields and
towards conservation of natural resources and the
environment. It is likely that climate change concerns
will also lead to some re-direction of R&D investment,
to goals such as crop tolerance to drought and other
extreme weather events.
Another large dilemma for research administrators,
both public and private, is how much effort to direct to
transgenic foods. While there remains strong opposi-
tion by some consumers and governments of large
countries to GM food production and imports, the
returns from such research will be dampened, both
absolutely and relative to efforts to produce non-food
GM crops (cotton, biofuels and other industrial
crops). R&D on the latter will reduce the upward
pressure that demands for those non-food crops
would otherwise put on food prices, but the anti-
GM food stance will continue to reduce the potential
for biotechnology to lower food prices in countries
where GM food is discouraged or banned—with
major implications for bilateral trade ﬂows since it
effectively divides the world food supplies into two
separate markets (Anderson & Jackson 2006).
4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Recent globalization has been characterized by a
decline in the costs of cross-border trade in farm
and other products. It has been driven by the ICT
revolution, declines in real transport costs and—in
the case of farm products—by reductions in govern-
mental distortions to agricultural incentives and
trade. The ﬁrst but maybe not the second of these
drivers will continue in coming decades. World food
prices will depend also on whether/by how much
farm productivity growth continues to outpace
demand growth. Demand in turn will be driven not
only by population and income growth, but also by
crude oil prices if they remain at current historically
high levels, since that will affect the biofuel
demand. Climate change mitigation policies and
adaptation, water market developments and market
access standards including for transgenic foods add
to future agricultural production, price and trade
uncertainties.
The key issues that modellers need to grapple with
in projecting world agricultural markets to 2050—
assuming they have already dealt with simulating the
macro-policy settings and the evolving pattern of inter-
national capital ﬂows and their effects on currency
exchange rates and broad comparative advantages—
are what to assume about trends and ﬂuctuations for
each country and hence globally in:
— price- and trade-distorting sectoral policies that
alter farmer and consumer incentives (which in
turn depend on the outcome of on-going Doha
trade negotiations and any subsequent WTO
rounds and regional trading agreements);
— TFP growth on farms in GM-free and GM-toler-
ant country settings;
— petroleum and related fossil fuel prices and their
impact on biofuel crop productivity growth; and
— climate variables and policy responses to climate
change, including for water and biofuels.
Governments can do, and some already are doing,
things to reduce the uncertainties associated with the
above issues. First, WTO members are trying to con-
clude the Doha trade negotiations. Trade opening
can lead to more effective resource conservation,
improve global welfare and reduce inequality, poverty,
malnutrition and hunger (Anderson et al. 2010a). The
signs are not promising for a very ambitious outcome
from Doha, however. It is even possible that excep-
tions for ‘sensitive’ and ‘special’ agricultural products
and a special safeguard mechanism to protect develop-
ing countries from import surges could discount
heavily the value of any new commitments. In that
case, and perhaps even more so if WTO members
fail to reach a conclusion to the Doha round, agricul-
tural protection growth could resume in HICs and/or
be emulated in developing countries, with both
country groups varying their protection rates in an
attempt to stabilize their domestic market—but at
the expense of destabilizing international food markets
and thereby encouraging even more countries to thus
intervene at their national border.
Second, governments could commit to a more
ambitious programme of support for agricultural
R&D investment, so as to slow or reverse the decline
since the 1990s in such investments. Lags between
R&D investments and farm productivity growth are
very long, but certainly results would show within
the next four decades. Governments yet to embrace
the relatively new agricultural biotechnologies could
reassess their stance in the light of (i) the experiences
of countries that have accepted this technology (as
environmental effects have been mostly benign or posi-
tive and no food safety issues are evident) and (ii) the
higher beneﬁts from expanding such investments now
that food price levels are higher and climate changes
are requiring farmer adaptation.
Finally, governments could make clear what their
policy responses will be to climate change. The difﬁ-
culties associated with this global issue make
multilateral trade negotiations look easy, as was clearly
demonstrated by the difﬁculty in drafting a
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conference on the issue in December 2009.
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